|
|||||||||||
Prof. Lars-Erik Cederman, ETH Zurich
Prof. Simon Hug, University of Geneva
Christa Deiwiks, ETH Zurich
Julian Wucherpfennig, ETH Zurich
Leading political economists emphasize the impact of materialist and logistical factors on conflict while down-playing the role of ethnicity (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004). While some question this “non-result” and attribute more causal power to ethnic factors, it remains the dominant view of the field (e.g., Sambanis 2004). Our project questions this claim. Far from being immaterial to conflict, we postulate that powerful excluded minorities have not only the means but also the motivations to challenge majority groups.
The proposed research relies on the guiding principles of the ECRP project. By disaggregating the nation-state, our focus will shift from general measures of ethnic diversity to measures sensitive to institutionally conditioned power relationships (Principle I). This shift in levels of analysis reveals that prevailing group identities and relevant institutions depend on conflict themselves and have to therefore be treated as integrated components of conflict processes (Principle III). Moreover, these reciprocal relationships require consideration of cross-border linkages (Principle II).
Our research unfolds in three steps. First, we assess how institutions affect the boundaries between the constitutive parts of the Basic Centre-Periphery (BCP) configuration. Different institutional arrangements determine the access to central power enjoyed by peripheral actors. These actors’ geographical location is also of great importance (Buhaug & Gates 2002). Hence, we study the geopolitical dynamics involving centre-periphery dyads at the group level. Furthermore, it is necessary to study how conflict influences both identities and institutions. Institutional choices are affected by previous conflict patterns and peripheral ethnic identities form in response to logistical conditions and institutional developments.
By addressing these theoretical tasks, we put the literature on nationalist insurgencies on a more solid conceptual footing. This research combines innovative formal modelling techniques, such as rational-choice and computational models, with the overall project’s data sources, including geographic information systems (GIS).
Buhaug, Halvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. "The Geography of Civil War". Journal of Peace Research 39(4):417-433.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4):563-95.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97 (1):75-90.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War". Perspectives on Politics 2(2):259-279
Wichtiger Hinweis:
Diese Website wird in älteren Versionen von Netscape ohne
graphische Elemente dargestellt. Die Funktionalität der
Website ist aber trotzdem gewährleistet. Wenn Sie diese
Website regelmässig benutzen, empfehlen wir Ihnen, auf
Ihrem Computer einen aktuellen Browser zu installieren. Weitere
Informationen finden Sie auf
folgender
Seite.
Important Note:
The content in this site is accessible to any browser or
Internet device, however, some graphics will display correctly
only in the newer versions of Netscape. To get the most out of
our site we suggest you upgrade to a newer browser.
More
information